Measured in blood, the price tag in Iraq is absolute: 4,238 Americans (PDF) have died during America's six-year war. For Iraqis, the toll is far greater. Icasualties.org, which tracks body counts reported by the media, notes nearly 45,000 civilians have been killed since Iraq's Shiite-led government was formed in April 2005; another website puts the tally since 2003 close to 100,000. Yet as the Pentagon prepares its exit strategy in line with President Barack Obama's announced plans to end the war by 2012, a wholly different calculus is emerging. With the end of combat rhetorically on the horizon, the cost of leaving is now measured in financial, logistical, and, above all, political terms.

Obama told marines at Camp Lejeune, North Carolina, that while the United States would leave Iraq "sovereign, stable, and self-reliant," the price of staying had become too great. "What we will not do is let the pursuit of the perfect stand in the way of achievable goals," the president said. "We cannot sustain indefinitely a commitment that has put a strain on our military and will cost the American people nearly a trillion dollars."

But if the mission has been expensive, the price of withdrawal is no zero-sum game. The United States has spent some $939 billion in combined operations since 2001, and the Obama administration has requested an additional $130 billion to pay for Iraq and Afghanistan next year (on top of the $75.5 billion the administration requested for the remainder of 2009). How much more it might need is pure guesswork. If Obama sticks to his threshold limit of fifty thousand American trainers in Iraq after combat ends--which the president says will happen by August 31, 2010--the United States could have as many as eighty thousand troops in Iraq and Afghanistan through 2011. Getting them out will cost billions. According to a January 2009 assessment (PDF) by the Congressional Budget Office, a combined thirty thousand troops in the two war zones could cost $388 billion in additional expenditures through 2019. Bump that up to seventy-five thousand troops, and U.S. taxpayers could shoulder an additional $867 billion before the decade is out--on top of what has already been spent.

Getting the troops home will take time as well as money. Back in 2007, military officials told the Baltimore Sun departing could take nearly two years to complete. Janet St. Laurent, a defense expert with the U.S. Government Accountability Office, told lawmakers last month (PDF) that as of November 2008 there were 286 U.S. installations in Iraq that would need closing. Shuttering even the smallest of these will take upwards of two months, she said, while closing installations like Balad Air Force Base--which houses about 24,000 troops and their support staff--could take "longer than 18 months."

Obama's new Iraq timeline roughly splits the difference between the sixteen months he promised as a candidate and the twenty-three-month timeline favored by some commanders (Time). Some analysts question whether the United States can afford to leave as soon as Obama has suggested. Stephen Biddle, CFR's senior fellow for defense policy, says he would have preferred a slower drawdown to maintain the peace between Iraq's political rivals; he told lawmakers in February 2009 (PDF) that repositioning forces to Afghanistan could leave the United States vulnerable in the event of a downward spiral in Iraq. Iraqi politicians are equally concerned. Sunni leaders fear clashes with Shiite factions once U.S. troops leave (al-Hayat), and others say Arab-Kurdish violence is likely in the power vacuum.

Aware of the risks, the White House has made no firm plans beyond the August 2010 date. Some analysts suggest a substantial contingent of troops should stay at least through national elections in December, a scenario Defense Secretary Robert Gates says is plausible. On March 2, 2009, the Pentagon announced a new brigade rotation to Iraq, meaning force numbers there will stay constant in the near term. Bennett Ramberg, a foreign policy consultant, argues in a new Foreign Affairs essay that when contemplating how long to stay in Iraq, the U.S. should consider lessons of disengagement from previous conflicts like Vietnam. "Abandonment damaged Washington's credibility at first," Ramberg writes, "but it was the best way to protect U.S. interests in the long run." Yet as author and military analyst Tomas E. Ricks writes on his blog, recent moves by the White House suggest Obama understands war doesn't end with a speech, a costly lesson the Bush administration learned the hard way.

The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) is an alliance promoting economic and political cooperation by fostering dialogue among its ten members: Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam. Now experts say the group may pursue a bigger role in the region to help its members cope with the global financial crisis. As the downturn shifts the geopolitics of the region--potentially increasing China's sway as a source of capital--ASEAN and the United States may look to tighten their economic and security ties to prevent the rise of a hegemon in Southeast Asia, experts say. With Secretary of State Hillary Clinton's stop in Indonesia on her first trip abroad in February 2009, the new Obama administration signaled interest in boosting U.S. engagement with ASEAN. In Jakarta, Clinton pressed for stronger U.S.-ASEAN ties and said the United States would reconsider signing the 1976 Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia (TAC). Though ASEAN has made gains in promoting economic and political coordination and fostering peace, the group has yet to grow into a major multilateral actor.

ASEAN was formed in the midst of the Vietnam War in 1967, uniting Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand against the potential threat of communist-led insurgency. It was intended as a security community, promoting social and political stability during a turbulent time, says CFR Senior Fellow Sheila A. Smith. In addition to preventing intraregional flare-ups, ASEAN provided a way for the countries to create "a voice for themselves in the broader Cold War arena so the Southeast Asian area would speak as one on particular issues," she says. To that end, in 1971 ASEAN signed a declaration that Southeast Asia was a Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality. The resolution was intended as a statement that ASEAN countries refused to be included in Cold War dividing lines, says Sheldon Simon, a professor of political science at Arizona State University.

The end of the Cold War left ASEAN "searching for a new organizing principle for security," Simon says. The ASEAN Regional Forum was established in 1993 to promote security in the broader Asia-Pacific region, but the body's contribution has involved more discussion than action, says Zachary Abuza, a professor of political science at Simmons College in Boston. Still, the regional forum has been responsible for increased transparency and defense cooperation through the publication of white papers, military exchanges, and the creation of a register of experts who can be called upon during conflicts.

Because members' security priorities vary, military and counterterrorism issues tend to be handled bilaterally between countries with shared concerns and trusting relationships, like Singapore and Malaysia or Singapore and Thailand. The captures of several Jemaah Islamiyah operatives have involved bilateral action. In 2003, a tip-off from Singapore's national intelligence agencies resulted in Thai authorities arresting Arifin bin Ali, who plotted the bombing of five embassies in Bangkok.

Experts say it's not surprising that ASEAN has yet to foster a stronger regional security community. Andrew Chau of the University of Queensland's School of Political Science and International Studies writes in Asian Survey that ASEAN's consensus-based decision-making and policy of non-interference in members' affairs have created a "state-centric approach to foreign policy behavior" that undermines regional integration initiatives. These principles cripple even ASEAN's most ambitious agreements. For example, the 2007 ASEAN Convention on Counter Terrorism was intended to create a "framework for regional cooperation to counter, prevent, and suppress terrorism," but it contains clauses allowing parties to withdraw from the agreement at any time. The convention also states that it does not contradict "the principles of sovereign equality and territorial integrity of States and that of non-interference in the internal affairs of other Parties"--meaning the agreement, like other ASEAN statements, is only as useful as ASEAN members choose to make it.

The alliance's non-interference principle came under scrutiny when the group drafted a charter in 2007, which all ten members ratified by October 2008. Early drafts of the charter included provisions for sanctions for charter violations and a system of compliance monitoring for ASEAN agreements, but these elements were cut after deliberations revealed conflicting visions on ASEAN's continued role in the region.

Experts say the concept of non-interference has become a tool for protecting human rights transgressors. Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, and Vietnam--countries with poor human rights records--balked at the proposition (Economist) to give the human rights commission established in the charter the power to monitor or investigate abuses (Brunei and Singapore also expressed reservations, fearful of opening the door to intervention in members' affairs). The commission was rendered virtually powerless, dismaying Indonesia and the Philippines, the last members to ratify the charter. The Philippines' senate minority leader, Aquilino Pimentel, who voted against ratification despite his country's endorsement, called the document a "sham"(AFP), while Indonesian legislator Sutradara Gintings said the charter's lack of protection for human rights indicated insignificant progress.

Some experts, like U.S. Ambassador for ASEAN Affairs Scot Marciel, stress the importance of the charter for equipping ASEAN with new diplomatic tools, like a dispute-settlement procedure, and setting an ambitious goal of achieving economic integration by 2015. Others have less faith: Barry Desker, the dean of the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies at Nanyang Technological University in Singapore, writes in Singapore's Straits Times that the charter merely "codifies existing norms"(PDF) and in some areas even represents a step backwards.

While the charter did not change ASEAN's conflict resolution tactics, the group's response to events in 2008 revealed willingness to use tougher diplomatic pressure on members. Such was the case after Cyclone Nargis in May 2008, when Myanmar's ruling junta allowed only limited international aid and insisted that aid be distributed through its military. In response, ASEAN called an emergency meeting of members' foreign ministers and issued a statement that "Myanmar should allow more international relief workers into the stricken areas, as the need is most urgent, given the unprecedented scale of the humanitarian disaster." While the statement "didn't quite condemn [Myanmar's] government," CFR's Smith says, it nonetheless "went further than ASEAN ever had in the past in being critical of the internal affairs of a member state." After Secretary-General Surin Pitsuwan continued to press for cooperation on a trip to Yangon, Myanmar's ruling junta finally allowed the entry of international aid workers.

At a May 2008 CFR meeting, Surin said ASEAN had been "baptized" by the cyclone, implying its response indicated a new, more proactive approach to tackling intraregional grievances. Still, human rights issues such as the house arrest of Myanmar's opposition leader Aung San Suu Kyi continue to spark conflict (Economist) within ASEAN and reveal the limitations posed by ASEAN's requirement of consensus for action. Arizona State's Simon says member countries have their own priorities at stake in dealing with Myanmar's unpopular actions. Thailand imports natural gas from Myanmar to account for 20 percent of its electricity, and countries with imperfect human rights records don't welcome interference in their affairs any more than Myanmar does.

ASEAN's diverse membership has presented difficulties as leaders plow through the "very, very tedious" process of dismantling barriers to trade, Surin told a CFR meeting. He said the process of creating one economic community was complex in an organization whose members' average per capita incomes ranged from $209 to $50,000 per year, requiring catering to a wide range of economic needs in setting trade standards. Still, annual trade between ASEAN members has grown from $79 billion in 1993 to $404 billion in 2007.

Facilitating trade requires far more than lowering tariffs, says Amy Searight, an adjunct professor of political science and international affairs at George Washington University. In fact, tariffs are already low--averaging less than 2 percent for the original six alliance members under the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA)--but Searight says the utilization rate of the AFTA preferential tariff is minimal. Because of persistent processing delays, the differences between the preferential rate and the countries' usual rates aren't significant enough to warrant the time needed to apply, she says. Government corruption and unreliable judicial systems in the region also create roadblocks to trade because they make contracts hard to enforce.

Catharin Dalpino, a visiting associate professor of Southeast Asian studies at Georgetown University, posits that the global financial crisis could spur ASEAN to more aggressively pursue intraregional trade, to hedge against the possibility of reduced demand for exports from major outside trading partners like the United States. But she asserts that ASEAN doesn't yet have the legal framework to support a fully implemented free-trade agreement. "They don't have a dispute resolution mechanism nor do they have a central authority to take disputes to," Dalpino says. The lack of a central mechanism also means that ASEAN members may respond to the global financial crisis with measures to protect their own economies instead of effectively coordinating action. What's more, the global slump may prompt a wave of protectionism among member nations. ASEAN countries and their trading partners may cripple agreements by adding to the lists of products excluded from free-trade commitments, Searight says.

If the 1997 Asian financial crisis is any indication, the current downturn will likely set ASEAN back in the economic integration process: in 1998, intraregional trade contracted by 15.9 percent, according to a 1999 ASEAN report. "Are they going to look like the EU by 2015? Not even close," Searight says. "But are they going to look a lot more integrated than they did twenty years ago? Yes."

The United States is a major trading partner: ASEAN is the sixth-largest market for U.S. exports, and U.S.-ASEAN trade totaled more than $170 billion in 2007. Experts say U.S. companies stand to benefit if ASEAN creates a more unified market because streamlined product standards and procedures across countries in the region could increase exports and improve the performance of U.S.-invested corporations within the region.

While the United States appears unlikely to enter into a free-trade agreement with ASEAN anytime soon, some experts believe Washington is moving toward engaging with ASEAN on a more multilateral basis. Marciel points to the creation of his ambassadorial post in 2008 as proof of U.S. interest in its relationship with ASEAN.

The global economic downturn may also motivate the United States and ASEAN to pursue more robust ties. If China successfully weathers the storm and reaches out to its harder-hit neighbors--as it already does with aid, cultural diplomacy, and infrastructure development, Dalpino says--it will increase its already considerable geopolitical sway in the region. ASEAN is currently China's fourth-largest trading partner, and bilateral trade between China and ASEAN is expected to exceed $200 billion in 2008, up from $190 billion in 2007. But as this Backgrounder points out, experts say countries in the region are calculating whether the political and economic benefits of closer ties with China outweigh the military risks. ASEAN countries want the United States to pay more attention to new security trends in the region, particularly China's military buildup, and Dalpino says ASEAN may reach out to ensure the U.S. role as "security guarantor" if China emerges from the global downturn "looking like a hero." Likewise, a stronger China would give the United States an impetus to secure tighter diplomatic ties with ASEAN, given the importance of Southeast Asian sea-lanes for the flow of goods and oil, says Derek J. Mitchell, a senior fellow in the CSIS International Security Program. India has also asserted a more decisive presence in the region: it is expected to sign a free-trade agreement (VOA) with ASEAN in February 2009, after leaders met in New Delhi in January to discuss potential joint actions to cope with the global economic crisis.

Though the United States ranks among the top three destinations for ASEAN exports outside the bloc, ASEAN periodically bristles at a perceived lack of U.S. interest in other aspects of the group's affairs. There is some truth in claims of U.S. indifference to the relationship, CFR's Smith says. "Many people in the American government find ASEAN frustrating to work with as a partner," she says. "The utility of ASEAN for America is questioned at times." Nonetheless, ASEAN remains the "go-to" for facilitating dialogue between major powers and Southeast Asia. "It's very low-key," Smith says, "but quite effective."

After a month of political back-and-forth, President Barack Obama's plans to address the most daunting U.S. economic crisis in eighty years are coming into focus. Speaking to a joint session of Congress on February 24, Obama outlined his strategy to rescue the struggling financial sector while simultaneously directing resources toward overhauling longer-term policy problems in U.S. health care, energy, and education. In doing so, Obama said the country's "day of reckoning has arrived" after a period of financial and political irresponsibility.

The historic speech built on an unprecedented series of moves since the president took office barely a month ago aimed at staving off economic disaster by bailing out banks and stimulating U.S. economic activity. On February 17, Obama signed a $787 billion economic stimulus package, including major outlays for infrastructure development. Days earlier, Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner unveiled plans for a $2.5 trillion bank bailout package (NYT) making use of funds from the government and private investors and calling for the U.S. Federal Reserve to print more money. But markets continued to tumble (FT), reaching ten-year lows before rallying slightly as the new president put the finishing touches on his speech.

Analysts remain divided over the degree to which these moves will bear fruit in terms of jobs, investment, or economic growth.  Thus far, Obama's initiatives have won popular support (Reuters),  but experts say the most challenging aspects of Obama's policy overhaul are yet to come, and the broader ramifications of his full-scale economic rethink remain far from obvious.

For starters, many observers find fault with the stimulus plan passed by Congress. The Economist says the legislation is "stuffed full of boondoggles" and concessions to special interests--though it adds that some of these concessions may have been made intentionally in an effort to get the bill passed quickly. Most economists now agree about the need for some form of economic stimulus, given heady declines across global markets since the middle of 2008. But some disagreements remain over Obama's particular strategy and policy mix. Among the most controversial areas:

• Stimulus as a strategy in general: The extent to which government spending boosts the economy remains disputed among economists, and many say the degree of effectiveness will rely heavily on expenditures being targeted narrowly and temporarily.
• Tax cuts: Some policymakers from Obama's own party have faulted the plan for its program of tax cuts, saying that they are broader than necessary (Obama's advisers have defended tax cuts as a strategy, saying that even if they prove less efficient than spending on infrastructure development, they will reap rewards more quickly).
• Budgetary obligations: News reports indicate that the president's first budget, which is due out shortly, indicates an intention to run record deficits for at least the duration of his first year in office. That possibility worries economists who say the rising need for borrowing to fund this deficit could push the U.S. government closer to defaulting on its international debts. Obama defended his programs on February 22, saying reductions in war spending and reforms to some entitlement programs will gradually reduce the deficit, cutting it in half by 2013 (FT).

Just how Obama's economic policies play out in practice will have serious global repercussions, too. Experts say a high U.S. budget deficit will necessitate borrowing funds internationally--one of the factors that led to geoeconomic imbalances, and ultimately the financial crisis, in the first place. But with oil prices sagging and China's economy also struggling, it remains unclear whether cash will flow as freely as it has in recent years. China recently warned (Xinhua) of the potentially negative effects of U.S. stimulus-related debt. This risk would be heightened if Washington is forced to take large capital stakes in U.S. commercial banks, as many news reports say is increasingly likely (NYT). The extent of this spending has fueled fears about Washington's future ability to pay off its international debt. the Economist's Gregory Ip notes that markets now price the risk of Washington defaulting on its international debts during the next ten years at around 6 percent (WashPost), as opposed to 1 percent a year prior.

These concerns notwithstanding, some analysts see reason for measured optimism about Obama's approach. Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke, testifying on Capitol Hill, sounded a note of optimism (USA Today) about a possible turnaround in late 2009, helping explain a late market rally before Obama's speech. The Financial Times judges in an editorial that Obama's strategy appears "mostly right," in that it appears to be geared toward temporary expenditures that will limit the long-term budgetary impact of stimulus spending.

Obama has also moved to ramp up the regulation of financial markets--a move most market watchers now agree is necessary, given the regulatory lapses that took place in the run-up to the current crisis. This Working Paper from 15 economists known as the Squam Lake Group gives detailed recommendations along those lines.

But few claim to have definitive answers. The Carlyle Group's David Rubenstein, in a recent interview with CFR.org, said the U.S. government's strategy is best understood as a "kitchen-sink approach." Washington doesn't "really know what will be necessary to make it work," Rubenstein said, "but they're willing to try almost anything." In a very uncertain economic climate, it's a dramatic strategy, but given the grave threats facing global markets, many economists now cautiously support the approach.